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The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

Creativity has become essential for organizations to remain competitive. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate the intervening role of knowledge sharing between affect-based trust and employee creativity. The study further investigates perceived organizational support as a conditional factor on the association between affect-based trust and employee creativity.

The study tackled the issue of common method variance by collecting data in dyads. Specifically, the study collected data from 368 employees and their supervisors working in various organizations in Pakistan through Google Forms in two waves. In the first wave, employees were approached on a convenience basis, whereas, in the second wave, data from their supervisors were collected.

Structural equation modeling was applied to test hypotheses. The study noted knowledge sharing as a mediator between affect-based trust and employee creativity. The study also noted that individuals with high perceptions of organizational support are more likely to strengthen the association between affect-based trust and knowledge sharing.

This study suggests management work on their employees’ affect-based trust-building. Employees who have relationships based on affect-based trust feel safe and are less afraid of being criticized for sharing their ideas and thoughts. This positively contributes to developing a cooperative environment which becomes the base for employee creativity.

Past studies have examined the association between general trust and employee creativity. To this backdrop, this study highlighted the importance of affect-based trust toward employee creativity. More specifically, drawing upon social exchange, this study is the first of its kind that examined the mediating role of knowledge sharing between affect-based trust and employee creativity, where perceived organizational support is examined as a conditional variable between affect-based trust and knowledge sharing.